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Introduction
"First priority during disaster situations is, and should be, human survival". The recent Katrina disaster in New Orleans, which resulted in over 1300 lives lost and 300 000 homes destroyed, is a dramatic example of the lack of efficient coordinated response to mitigate the consequences of large disasters (US House of Representatives, 2006) . The failure in coordination occurred at a number of levels and perhaps in the case of Katrina the most important one was at the decision-making level. Regardless of the particular reasons underlying this failure, it can be assumed, nonetheless, that there was a general lack of awareness of the full magnitude of the problem and of the temporal dynamics of its development. These dynamics, driven by hard-to-predict specific events and interdependencies among physical and political infrastructures, would have required preparation scenarios and deployment responses commensurate with the magnitude of the events. It is a very difficult task to assess the impact of physical and temporal interdependencies among multiple infrastructure systems during the development of large disaster events since the impact of these interdependencies may be hidden on its temporal consequences. Simulation of disaster scenarios can provide a valuable tool for understanding and coordinating the responses of the individual infrastructures and assessing the full impact of their interdependencies. Presently, most disaster simulation tools fall into two wide categories: 1 at the high level of Emergency Preparedness Organizations, where a wide global view of the problem is taken which may fail to account for unforeseen temporal interdependencies 2 at the detailed level of First Responders, where a necessarily localised view of the problem prevents assessing the larger picture.
In this paper, we propose a generalised systems engineering view of the problem which is scalable to the degree of detail needed at the different levels of management and decision making.
From a system point of view, the basic function of the infrastructures is to transfer resources (tokens) from the location where the resources are produced or stored (generators) to the location where the resources are utilised or accumulated (loads). Apart from limited local storage, generators and loads are normally geographically apart. The global system's objective is to ensure that at any given moment, and under dynamically changing conditions of generation, load, and transportation channels, the (possibly limited) tokens available in the system are optimally (in the sense of time and amount) delivered to the loads. Different infrastructures (such as the power grid and water system) are interdependent on each other at a number of operational points and also at the critical level of the transportation systems, where limited channel capacity and time delays may make very difficult to satisfy the time constraints.
A time-domain Infrastructures Interdependencies Simulator (I2SIM) is proposed to allow the playing out of dynamic, time sensitive events, and bring out critical interdependencies among infrastructure systems. The results of these scenarios can then be used to optimise procedures and resources allocation. I2SIM is being designed to be a very fast real time simulator which can also provide a valuable tool while the disaster is actually happening by being able to 'look ahead' at the predicted consequences of suggested decision actions before these decisions are actually made ('what if scenarios').
Temporal coordination to satisfy survival needs
When making human survival the main objective of disaster response, the timing of the response becomes critical. The most crucial aspect in dealing with large disaster situations is to provide for the safety and well being of the population affected. Panic control and care of critically injured victims requires immediate response. In many cases the fast timings needed for this immediate response can only be achieved by making a certain amount of resources available onsite when the disaster strikes. The dynamic islanding concept in Hollman et al. (2006) discusses geopolitical structures to coordinate these needs. This concept, in conjunction with system partitioning strategies based on network theory (Kron, 1963; Strogatz, 2003; Martí et al., 1998; 2002) can be used to optimise the delivery of the survival goods. The main emphasis of the present paper is the conceptualisation and formulation of the equations of a network theory model that can capture critical temporal interdependencies.
A common attribute of industrialised societies with their high quality of life is the (erroneous) belief that the essential services and infrastructures that feed their life lines will be available even during extreme disaster conditions. In the most common case, the emergency contingency plans of particular infrastructures are drafted assuming that the other infrastructures will be operating at normal capacity. The failure to recognise that during large disasters multiple infrastructures are affected simultaneously, and to understand the effects of these interdependencies on the recovery of the combined system, can make the most carefully (but independently) laid out response plans result in chaotic combined effects. Paradoxically, the same technological sophistication and robustness that may be considered an asset in normal circumstances may in fact be the Achilles' heel of industrialised societies during emergencies (Vacca, 1971) . As infrastructure systems become more sophisticated, they also become more vulnerable and fragile when the interdependencies between CIs are stressed by timing coordination requirements. Consider a simple three-sector model consisting of energy, food, and clothing (Sage, 1977) . A system matrix that relates the contributions from each of the sectors to the production of the other sectors can be set up. Consequently, the failure of any one of the sectors will have repercussions on all the others. In complex, highly nonlinear systems, when multiple infrastructures fail simultaneously the equilibrium points can become very sensitive and eventually unstable. This problem is much compounded when event dynamics are time dependent. It is important to recognise that in these cases the exclusive allocation of extra resources or infrastructure reinforcement may have small effects towards system stability if time sensitive interdependency issues are not properly addressed. The recent large disaster situations across the world (e.g., the 2004 tsunami in South Asia, and the 2005 hurricane Katrina in the USA) illustrate the criticality of timing and interdependency problems and are dramatic examples of the difficulties posed by these issues.
Figure 1
Dynamic human needs and optimisation objectives The objective of maximising human survival requires an understanding of the basic human survival needs and the urgency under which these needs have to be satisfied. As introduced in 'A theory of human motivation' (Maslow, 1943) , humans have different levels of needs which are determined by their socio economic environment. A connection can be established between human motivation theory and emergency management due to the dynamic characteristic of emergency conditions . For each particular emergency phase, a different set of basic needs has to be met ( Figure 1 ). This set will define the criticality of a subset of CIs during and after extreme events. As the recovery process takes place, the core set of CIs will expand towards its maximum level.
The I2SIM simulator
A main objective of our project is to build a simulator of infrastructures (I2SIM) capable of capturing the complex time line dynamics that occur in a system of multiple infrastructures as events develop during large disaster situations. The system modelling and solution approach implemented in I2SIM is based on a dynamic time-sensitive coordination of the delivery of the vital goods and services required to maximise human survivability. I2SIM models the network of networks that results when multiple CIs are brought into the picture simultaneously. A main challenge in putting together this system of systems is to identify the minimum amount of information exchange required among different infrastructures to coordinate their operation. The information exchange process should avoid reaching a level of granularity that only individual infrastructures know (or need to know) in order to perform their internal functions properly. At the same time, enough information must be exchanged to identify the essential dynamics of the combined behaviour of all infrastructures responding together.
System model
It is important to distinguish what the objectives of the various sectors of the system of infrastructures are during normal times and during emergencies. Not only will the core set of CIs change depending on the emergency stage but also the global operation objectives. Optimisations during normal life usually follow the model of minimising cost per product or service produced. During emergencies, on the other hand, time delays can make the difference between life and death. The function objective during emergencies shifts from economical optimisation to saving human lives as illustrated in Figure 1 . There are two schools of thought in modelling economic systems where goods are produced and goods are consumed: 'mathematical economics' and 'literary economics' (Chiang, 1984) . In mathematical economics, more akin to systems engineering, the logical relationships between entities and quantities are expressed in terms of mathematical symbols. In literary economics, the relationships are expressed in terms of predicate logic. Due to the large geo-temporal extension of the problem of coordinating infrastructures recovery dynamics during large disasters and due to the highly nonlinear nature of the relationships, we have chosen the mathematical equations approach to describe the physical layer of the system of infrastructures. This gives us access to the large pool of available mathematical tools and systems theory techniques for the solution of large and complex network systems. The analytical description also allows us to identify more readily the system's weak points, instabilities, and directions where design changes can be made to achieve maximum system robustness at minimum costs. The description of a system of infrastructures requires at least two layers: the physical layer and the human layer. In this paper, we will concentrate on the physical layer. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate two infrastructure networks, the medicines network and the electric power network. The medicines network was chosen as a discussion example because one is usually accustomed to thinking of electricity or water as a flow through electrical wires of water pipes but the concept is equally valid for any item that has to be transported from one node to another. The components of these networks are described next.
Figure 2
Medicines network (token 3)
Figure 3
Electric power network (token 1) 
System components
Before describing the proposed system model, we need to introduce our ontology (Martí et al., 2005; 2006; Kruchten and Woo, 2005) :
Tokens are goods or services that are provided by some entity (e.g., manufacturer or distributor) to another entity that uses them. For example, a TV set is a token that a customer (user) can get from a TV store (provider, distributor). Likewise, the TV store, now as a user, can get the set from the TV manufacturer (provider, creator).
A cell is an entity that performs a function. For instance, a hospital is a cell that uses input tokens: electricity, water, medicines, etc., and produces output tokens: e.g., beds served. Nodes may be conformed by one or multiple cells. What defines a node is the temporal or spatial separation between one cluster of cells and the other. Nodes are connected by transportation channels.
A node is a generator of tokens if the tokens produced by its cells, or taken out from its storing facilities, are exported to other nodes. Similarly, a node can be a load if it receives tokens from other nodes which it then delivers to its internal cells for immediate use or storage. In the most general and common case, a node will be a generator of some tokens and a load of other tokens.
Transportation channels are the means by which tokens flow from a generator node to a load node. A non-ideal channel (normal case) will constrain the number of tokens that can be transmitted from generator nodes to load nodes and will impose a time delay before the tokens are received. If the channel is broken down, zero tokens can be transmitted through that channel.
In our multiple infrastructures tokens simulator (I2SIM), the components of the physical layer, tokens, cells, nodes, and transportation channels, are glued together by two levels of relationships. The first level is the cell equations where specific amounts of input tokens are needed to produce specific amounts of output tokens. Next, since the tokens are delivered through transportation networks from more than one generator node to more than one load node, the topological relationships and the channel characteristics (channel capacity and time delay) will give another set of conditions that must be satisfied.
Survival tokens
To maximise saved human lives during large disasters, we need first to identify the basic survival tokens that are needed by the victims of the disaster and then optimise the system to deliver these tokens within the time constraints of human survival. Even though lists of survival tokens can be found in a number of sources, we would still like to summarise our own list here. We subdivide the survival needs into two groups:
1 Individual needs
• potable water (suitable for drinking)
• food (adequate for emergency situations)
• body shelter (breathable air, clothing, temperature, housing)
• personal communication (whereabouts of loved ones)
• individual preparedness (education)
• sanitation (waste disposal, washing)
• medical care (medicines, physicians, nurses).
2 Group needs • panic control (hope, political and religious leaders, psychologists, media)
• civil order (fire fighters, police, army).
Our system optimisation objective is to deliver these vital survival tokens on the time frame dictated by human survival needs. A cooperation framework of public and private sector policies to implement a coordinated strategy to meet the survival timelines is presented by Hollman et al. (2006) . The present work deals with the physical constraints for the delivery of survival tokens on the physical layer. Further research involving the modelling of the human layer of decision making for the delivery of these tokens, the aspects related to group needs is done by other members of our team.
Cell equations
For the purpose of describing a typical cell it is instructive to consider a hospital cell shown in Figure 4 . The cell's job can be characterised using an input-output model (Sage, 1977) . The cell uses a number of input tokens: electricity, water, medicines, doctors, and nurses to produce an output token: hospital beds. A given token in the cell will then be denoted as x kj . The first subscript will indicate the node number in the network of Figure 2 . The hospital is node k = 2. The second subscript will indicate the type of token, for example medicines is token j = 3. The tokens in the hospital cell ( Figure 4) , .
x electricity x water x medicines x doctors
x nurses x beds
If we assume for simplicity that the relationship between input and output is a linear one (which in the case of the hospital is not), we can say that to produce a number of beds (output) we need a certain amount of each of the input tokens and, for generalisation, of the output itself (e.g., worn out beds or old equipment). Mathematically: .
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The coefficients a j indicate how many units of token j are needed per unit of output token 6 (hospital beds). It is easy to see that in this example, the relationship cannot be linear. Indeed, if only electricity (token 1) was available, but there were no doctors, no medicines, etc., the output (beds) would have to be zero. The correct relationship among tokens in Equation (2) needs to be expressed by some nonlinear function: 21  22  23  24  25  26   ,  ,  ,  , ,
To generalise, if for the hospital (Node 2), we define a vector of tokens: x t
x t
x t X t
Then the hospital cell must satisfy the vector function:
All cells in the medicines network of Figure 2 must satisfy their internal cell functions, i.e.: The hospital as a cell is connected to all the networks that provide the tokens it needs to manufacture its product (beds) and is also connected to the recipients of its product (patients). The diagram in Figure 5 illustrates these relationships. Each arrow in this diagram corresponds to an entire token network, such as the medicines network of Figure 2 and the electric power network of Figure 3 .
Figure 5
Tokens flow diagram for the hospital cell
Transportation networks
The tokens needed at the nodes for the cells to do their jobs will in general (apart from local storage) have to come from the other nodes. For a token that has to be delivered to the cell, the cell will be a load node. The tokens will travel through the transportation network from generator nodes to load nodes. For a given token, multiple generator nodes of that token may exist and likewise multiple load nodes for that token may exist. There will be multiple channels linking generator nodes to load nodes. For a given generator node, dispatching decisions will determine how the node's token production will be distributed among the channels coming out of the node. Once the tokens are in the channels, they will be affected by the channel's capacity and transportation delays. After the transportation delay, the tokens will arrive at the load node connected to that channel. For that load node, from all channels connected to it. How many token units are received at a given load node at a given time instant will depend on the total amount of tokens generated in the system, on the dispatching decisions, and on the channels' capacity and delays.
Transportation channels
Consider again the example of the hospital cell. Suppose that because of an emergency, the number of patients per hour it needs to treat has exhausted the medicines in the storage room. Additional medicines need to be delivered by the medicines network of Suppliers A and B located in Nodes 4 and 1. After an analysis of the situation (using, for example, centralised analysis with our I2SIM simulator), it is decided that Supplier A at Node 4 will dispatch to the Hospital at Node 2 the amount of D 42 medicines and Supplier B at Node 1 will dispatch D 12 medicines. Supplier A will put the medicines in a delivery truck (assume the supplier owns the truck). This truck is to travel through the city from the location of Node 4 to the location of Node 2. In making this delivery, the medicines network will be using facilities from the 'roads network'. However, for the purpose of the medicines delivery, the particular streets used is not relevant, what is important is how long it will take for the truck to make its trip from Node 4 to Node 2 (channel delay). It is up to the roads network to advise the medicines network (infrastructure interdependency) as to which combination of streets will result in the shortest delivery time. The roads network will provide the medicines network with the 'channel characteristics' for the medicines to be transported from Node 4 to Node 2 and for Node 1 to Node 2. Only the roads network can provide the information of the channel delays to the medicines network because other vehicles, from other networks, will be simultaneously using the road network's facilities. The medicines that Node 4 will dispatch to Node 2 will travel through channel λ 42 . We can postulate the following relationship between the tokens received at 2 and the tokens sent at 4 ( Figure 6 where subscript λ stands for 'link'.
Figure 6
Transportation channel model Parameter g 42 is the 'conductance' of the channel and has two parts: m 42 for magnitude and 42 k z − for time delay. Mathematically, z -k is the 'time delay operator' (Oppenheim and Schafer, 1999) defined as z -k f (t) = f (tk). If there are no medicines lost or damaged during the trip, m = 1 (if 10% of the medicines are damaged m = 0.9), and if the trip takes two hours, k 42 = 2 (assuming one time delay unit is one hour). Equation (7) then becomes:
Equation (8) says that the medicines arriving at Node 2 at a given time are the same as the medicines dispatched from Node 4 two hours earlier.
The symbol for the channel model in Figure 6 is borrowed from wave propagation in electrical transmission lines (a wave injected at the sending end of an electrical transmission line will arrive at the receiving end after the line travelling time). 2
In transportation systems such as roads, the channel delay will be a function of the distance between sending node and receiving node and of the amount of traffic from all the networks using those roads (congestion). The larger the distance and the worse the congestion, the longer the time delay will be. In other transportation systems, such as electric power, there is no transportation delay within the time frame of human events since electricity travels at the speed of light. However, there is a maximum amount of power that can be carried by a given power 'corridor' (consisting, for example, of overhead lines, transformers, and other equipment). In the I2SIM simulator, the power corridors in the electrical network (Figure 3 ) would use the model of Figure 6 with zero travelling time (k 12 ). Power losses in the conductors can be accounted (if so desired) by a value of m 12 < 1. The maximum channel capacity should be considered as a limit in the dispatch block D 12 . In the water system there might be both a channel capacity and a transportation delay.
Broken links or reduced capacity links during disaster situations can be modelled easily with the model of Figure 6 . If the medicines truck route involves a broken road that is expected to be repaired in three hours, the link delay in Figure 6 would be five hours (three hours for the road repair and two hours for the truck's travelling time). If an electric power line has to be disconnected for four hours due to a fault, the link model for the line would include the transmission line maximum power capacity plus a delay of four hours.
Flow of tokens and dispatching decisions
Consider a load node and a generator node in a token transportation network (Figure 7) . The continuity equation requires that the sum of all tokens arriving at a load node from all links connected to the node must equal the total of the tokens going into the node's cells. Similarly, for a generator node the sum of all dispatches must equal the total tokens generated. These equations correspond to Kirchhoff's Current Law (KCL) in electrical circuits.
Figure 7
Continuity equation at nodes 
It is the dispatching decision at a generator node that determines how much of the token amount generated at the node, e.g., x 4 (t) in Figure 7 , will be traveling out of the individual channels connected to the node, i.e., D 42 (t), D 43 (t), D 45 (t). The only network condition that needs to be satisfied is the continuity condition of Equation (10). After the dispatching decision has been made, the capacity and delay of the channel will determine the token amounts received at the different load nodes.
System solutions and optimisation
The network conditions of Equations (9) and (10), together with the channel equations of Equation (7), allow us to set up a system of difference equations that contain the spatial-temporal constraints on a given token's availability to perform a given cell's function Equation (6). The network conditions apply to each token separately: there is a network for each token. The cell functions integrate all the tokens. It is also important to note that the network equations for each token constitute a system of linear equations at each instant t of the system solution, while the cell equations are nonlinear. This is a very important characteristic of the approach suggested in this paper. By separating the linear parts from the nonlinear parts of the solution, the iterations needed to satisfy the nonlinear parts are much faster and simpler, and considerable gains in solution speeds can be achieved. This is the same solution strategy followed in the real-time power system simulator (Martí et al., 2002) where speed gains of several orders of magnitude are achieved (Martí and Hollman, 2003) . The equations for the system of infrastructures form a system of discrete time equations with high-order delays contributed by the transportation equations. These time delays define the dynamics of the system. The system of discrete time equations is solved one time step at the time, i.e., at t = 0, ∆t, 2∆t, 3∆t, Λ using the well-developed techniques of Dommel (1969) and Martí et al. (2002) . Linearising the cell nonlinearities at each time step, one can set up the solution in terms of network matrices and obtain important system dynamics. Among the possibilities: • Eigenvalues for system stability and delimitation of critical zones • Jacobian matrices for gradients and direction towards optimisation • Hessian matrices for maxima and minima operating regions.
These tools allow for optimum designs within given system constraints. An essential objective during disaster simulations is to make sure that the system resources are made available to the victims in the required amounts and within the needed timelines. For a given amount of system resources, the amount of tokens delivered to a given node will depend on the dispatching decisions. The proposed solution framework in terms of network tokens flow allows the formulation of this problem as an optimum dispatch problem, for which abundant literature exists, for example, in the field of electric power transmission (Dommel and Tinney, 1968) . Another advantage of the proposed network solution is its ability to integrate with other solution layers. For example, many of the functions of the human decisions layer can be integrated with the channels dispatching blocks (D ik ) and many of the functions of system monitoring and assessment can be integrated with the channel's capacity and delay times (e.g., channel down times and repair times estimation).
Conclusion
The methodology introduced in this paper aims at providing a system solution framework to the combined workings of multiple infrastructures. An ontology for the described problem solution is also introduced. The proposed solution focuses on temporal interdependencies among multiple infrastructures reacting to a large disaster situation. These temporal interdependencies are fundamental, for example, to defining system partitioning (islanding) strategies to provide survival goods and services to disaster victims in the required time frame. The paper addresses solutions at the physical layer. Other aspects, such as human decisions, human behaviour during extreme events, media coverage, and visualisation available to emergency responders, among others, are extremely important and should not be overlooked. They are, therefore, an integral part of our UBC-JIIRP on going work. The principles outlined in the paper with respect to the physical layer are, however, very general and constitute a reference frame for our ongoing parallel work to coordinate the other human-related layers with the physical layer. As stated in this paper, our UBC-JIIRP team believes that the first priority during emergency should be human survival and our efforts are focused on this goal. We believe our work is a step forward to achieving this.
